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Abstract Although it is known that ethnic biases exist in Africa, less is known about how
these respond to natural resource prices. Many ethnically fragmented African countries
depend on a small number commodities for their export base. Oil prices experienced in
early life predict differential adult outcomes across Nigerian ethnic groups. Our difference-
in-difference approach compares members of southern ethnicities to other Nigerians from
the same birth cohort. This North-South distinction mirrors several economic, political, and
religious cleavages in the country. Greater prices in a southern individual’s birth year predict
several relative outcomes, including reduced fertility, delayed marriage, higher probabilities
of working and having a skilled occupation, greater schooling, lower height, and greater BMI.
These microeconomic impacts are explained by macroeconomic responses to oil prices; rel-
atively, urban incomes increase, food production declines, and maternal labor intensifies in
the South.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we ask whether members of African ethnic groups benefit differentially from
positive commodity price shocks in resource producing countries. The division of increased
returns to commodity production is central to whether or not natural resources contribute
to development and growth (Sachs and Warner 2001; Mehlum et al. 2006). Further, ethnic
fragmentation is an important component of Africa’s growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine
1997; Posner 2004). We focus on Nigeria. Nigeria is dependent on oil; oil rents accounted
for 26.8% of GDP in 2012 (World Bank 2012) and oil provided 70% of government revenues
in 2011 (NRGI 2013). Nigeria is well known for failing to convert its resource windfall into
development. From 1960 to 2000, more than $350 billion in oil revenue in 1995 dollars
was collected by the Nigerian government while, depending on the estimate, real income
per capita either fell or made only modest gains (Marwah 2014).1 During the oil boom of
the 1970s, government spending and access to international capital increased, but annual
production of Nigeria’s major cash crops declined (Pinto 1987).
By testing whether members of certain ethnic groups benefit differentially from positive
oil shocks, we assess the distributional impacts of oil price changes across regions and
across ethnicities. This task is made difficult by the absence of nationally representative
sub-national data on individuals’ living standards over long periods of time. For example,
the Nigeria Living Standards Measurement Study covers only three waves, the first in 2010.
The first national survey from which a distribution of living standards can be computed
took place in 1992 (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 100). Tracing the relative impacts of changing oil
prices is not as simple as measuring the distribution of government spending over space,
since many macroeconomic responses to oil are not driven by government spending. We
focus, then, on final outcomes for individuals. Our approach is to test whether real oil price
shocks experienced in early life affect human capital outcomes of members of Nigeria’s
ethnic groups. This allows us to recover the ultimate distribution of the relative impacts of
changes in oil prices.
We use individual data on women from the nationally representative 2008 Nigeria Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS). We employ a difference-in-difference approach that
exploits variation over time within ethnic groups and that compares members of South-
ern ethnic groups to other Nigerians born in the same year, allowing for ethnicity-specific
time trends. Though our baseline North-South distinction is coarse, it features prominently in
the secondary literature (e.g. Archibong 2016; Dev et al. 2016; Falola and Heaton 2008). The
bulk of Nigerian oil is produced in the Niger Delta region of the south. Levels of education
have been higher in the south since at least 1960, and members of southern ethnic groups are
over-represented in the professions and the civil service. Control of the executive between
independence and the return to democracy in 1999 was predominantly held by Northern-
ers. While the south received more colonial missions and is predominantly Christian, the
North is predominantly Muslim. The North-South distinction is also reflected in the data.
We disaggregate our effects into finer ethnic categories, and show that outcomes for multiple
southern groups and multiple northern groups move together in response to oil prices. Delta
ethnicities, in particular, have outcomes whose responses to oil prices resemble those of other
southern groups.
Although oil is important to Nigeria, the country is a small producer and part of the
“competitive fringe” that does not coordinate its production quantities with OPEC (Griffin
1 A large literature is cited below that seeks to explain Nigeria’s growth failure. One neglected factor is
Malthusian pressure (e.g. Galor and Mountford 2008). Nigeria’s total fertility rate rose during the oil boom.
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1985). World oil prices, then, can be taken as exogenous from the Nigerian perspective.2 These
correlate strongly with the total value of Nigerian oil production, without being potentially
contaminated by an endogenous production quantity response.
Our main finding is that relative economic outcomes for Southern groups respond pos-
itively to oil prices, but that relative health outcomes respond negatively. Positive oil price
shocks increase years of education, make a woman more likely to have a skilled occupation
and to be in work, reduce fertility, and raise age at first marriage compared to a woman from
a Northern ethnic group born in the same year. However, positive oil price shocks reduce
relative height and increase relative BMI. The effects we find are economically meaningful.
Across our outcome variables, a one standard deviation movement in early-life oil prices
changes the outcome variables by roughly 0.05 to 0.10 standard deviations, magnitudes that
are similar to other early life treatments in the literature.
Why are these findings significant for economic thought? Ethnic inequality reduces growth
through civil conflict, limited public goods provision, lower social capital, and distrust of mar-
ket economies (Alesina et al. 2016). Despite its importance, the origins of ethnic inequality
are not well understood. Existing empirical work has focused on political variables such as
control of the executive (Burgess et al. 2015; Franck and Rainer 2012). Alesina et al. (2016)
show that inequality in geographic endowments predicts inequality across ethnic groups. And
yet our results are both net of time-invariant factors such as geography and reveal relative
Southern gains in a time of Northern political dominance. Our results demonstrate, then, that
additional factors contribute to this important determinant of economic growth.
Our results can be understood as microeconomic responses to the macroeconomic changes
prompted by oil prices. While there are several complicated mechanisms driving our results,
we focus in this paper on a core set of changes that have been emphasized in the secondary
literature, that are consistent with the empirical results that we find, and that we can evaluate
empirically. In the appendix, we present several additional results that we use to evaluate
a larger set of possible mechanisms. These changes are not as simple as local economic
spillovers in the areas where oil is produced; we find little difference in responses between
the oil-producing Delta region and the remainder of Southern Nigeria. The oil sector employs
less than 1% of the Nigerian labor force (Fajana et al. 2005).
The existing literature has argued that oil revenues spurred a decline of agriculture, volume
growth in the oil sector, and increasing urban employment in services and manufacturing
(Bevan et al. 1999, p. 186). The secondary literature emphsizes that the decline of agriculture
and growth of urban services and manufacturing employment was greater in the South, due
to a variety of factors such as the labor-intensiveness of Southern agriculture and the high
wages in oil and related urban sectors (Scherr 1989; Walker 2000; Khan 1994). The secondary
literature also notes that the gap between the richer South and the poorer North grew during
the oil boom (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 107). Manufacturing grew in the South where it had been
traditionally concentrated, and rising managerial, professional, and public sector employment
drew from the Southern ethnic groups that were already over-represented in these sectors
(Mustapha 2006). We indeed show empirically that our results can be partly explained by
the levels of education that predated the oil boom, and that oil prices accentuated baseline
differences between the North and South.
Our results support a similar story. Southern households benefit economically relative to
the North from positive oil price shocks, and use this advantage to invest in more, better-
educated (though not necessarily healthier) children. Adverse health effects result in part
2 The existing literature takes Nigeria to be a price taker: see Abidoye and Calí (2015), Chuku et al. (2011),
Lukonga (1994), or Wlazlowski et al. (2011). The correlation of the log real oil price and Nigerian oil production
over the period 1958–2004 is positive, with ρ = 0.5094.
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because Southern households face a greater opportunity cost of time and reduce some early-
life investments in their children, particularly vaccinations.3 Additional explanations of the
relative adverse health effects include urbanization and food prices. Using additional waves
of the DHS data, we show that indeed Southern households have more assets and women
are more likely to work when oil prices are higher. We show a strong negative correlation
between Nigerian per capita food production and oil prices. We also find that men in southern
Nigeria are relatively less likely to work in agriculture in years of high oil prices.
1.1 Related literature
We contribute to the literatures on ethnic inequality, early life shocks and investments, and
the effects of commodity price shocks in general and natural resource windfalls in particular.
The importance of ethnic divisions for outcomes such as government quality, conflict
and public goods provision is not limited to Africa (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Esteban et al.
2012). Large intra-country differences in economic development exist across ethnic groups in
much of Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). The importance of Africa’s ethnic
divisions for outcomes such as the distribution of political power (Francois et al. 2015),
the provision of public goods (Glennerster et al. 2013; Franck and Rainer 2012), and the
incidence of conflict (Desmet et al. 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016) has been
the subject of considerable quantitative research. Most of the literature has focused on the
consequences of ethnic politics on macroeconomic outcomes.
Our study adds to this literature by considering whether positive commodity price shocks
increase the relative standing of specific ethnicities in a way that improves outcomes for their
members. We thus add evidence on the time-varying sources of ethnic inequality, and on the
importance of shocks other than the distribution of political power that can alter the relative
fortunes of a country’s ethnic groups. Our results are consistent with the pattern highlighted
by Chua (2004), in which external economic shocks can amplify existing ethnic differences
within countries.
Existing research has looked at the impact of many different early life shocks, including
disease burdens, weather, and government assistance programs (Almond 2006; Maccini and
Yang 2009; Hoyne et al. 2016). In particular, this literature has focused on the “fetal origins”
of long-run health (Almond and Currie 2011). We assess a broad range of adult outcomes,
including education and marriage behavior. Our contribution to this literature is two-fold.
First, we add to the empirical evidence on whether parental investments mitigate or rein-
force early life shocks and, if so, how effectively. Recent work has suggested that parental
investments are mostly reinforcing (Adhvaryu and Nyshadham 2016; Almond and Mazumder
2013) and that the investments made early in life are particularly productive (Cunha et al.
2010; Bharadwaj et al. 2013). We do not find strong evidence of reinforcing investments,
as Southern mothers invest less in vaccination years of higher oil prices. Second, though
the literature on early life circumstance is extensive, little of it has focused on the impact
of strictly economic shocks such as commodity prices, notable exceptions being Adhvaryu
et al. (2014a) and Cogneau and Jedwab (2012). This is despite the particular vulnerability of
poor countries to movements in commodity prices (Deaton 1999).
The third body of research our paper is related to concerns the political economy and human
capital effects of commodity price shocks. Existing work has considered the importance of
these shocks for outcomes such as conflict (Brückner and Ciccone 2010), health spending
(Acemoglu et al. 2013), government fiscal positions (Arezki and Brückner 2012), household
3 Our results are, then, relevant to quality-quantity models of fertility (Galor 2005, 2011).
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enterprize (Adhvaryu et al. 2014b), and child outcomes such as survival, schooling and
labor (Kruger 2007; Miller and Urdinola 2010). Oil is a capital-intensive “point source”
resource, and so price increases might be expected to have adverse effects on conflict and
health outcomes. Existing studies have found that oil rents may reduce democracy (Tsui
2011), increase corruption (Arezki and Brückner 2011), and reduce the status of women
(Ross 2008). We add to this literature by considering the long-run effects of these shocks,
heterogeneity in responses to these shocks at the sub-national level, and the degree to which
short-term responses help explain long-run outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on oil
production and the political economy of economic growth in Nigeria. Section 2 also outlines
our conceptual framework: our understanding of the macroeconomic responses to oil prices
that explain our microeconomic outcomes. Section 3 explains our identification strategy and
outlines our sources of data. Section 4 presents results. Section 5 tests between potential
mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and conceptual framework
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Oil in Nigeria
Oil production in Nigeria began in December 1957. From 1970, crude oil has been Nigeria’s
main export, accounting for over 90% of Nigeria’s exports over the past four decades (Udosen
et al. 2010). The oil boom of the 1970s was one of rapid capital accumulation, declining
total factor productivity, and shrinking capacity utilization. Since oil has become dominant,
Nigerian growth has been exceptionally volatile (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013). As
a consequence, the size of government has also been volatile (Ross 2003). Though there is no
evidence that the relative price of tradable goods to non-tradable goods followed the classic
“Dutch Disease” pattern, it is clear that the agricultural sector declined in favor of services,
especially government services (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013).
Oil revenue accrues to the central government through its ownership of the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation, which operates the contracts for oil production between the
Nigerian government and the private oil companies that are in charge of production. Taxes
are collected on the profits from petroleum production, and government revenue is sensitive
to the price of oil.
Since the beginning of oil production, there has been considerable fluctuation in the
fraction of oil revenues that remain in the producing state. Between 1946 and 2003, the rules
for revenue allocation were changed eighteen times (Ross 2003). Until 1975, states kept up
to 45% of oil revenues, falling to 20% from 1975 to 1979 and then to less than 5% until 1999.
Under the 1999 constitution, at least 13% of revenue must be transferred to oil-producing
states (Fig. 1), which has resulted in an upward jump in the fraction of oil revenues going
to oil-producing regions (Nigeria 2006). We do not use these rule changes in our empirical
work; none of the women in our sample were born after 1999, it is not clear these rules reflect
actual spending, and we do not propose that government spending is necessarily the principal
mechanism behind our main results.
Government revenues during the high oil prices of the 1970s are largely understood to have
been misspent. Spending on the military and education maintained a large non-productive
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Oil Producing
Other South
Fig. 1 The South and the oil producing states
population (Freund 1978). Although some of the revenues were invested in projects such as
school building, some two thirds of officially recorded “investment” was not in fact invest-
ment; much of this spending instead went to “ghost construction” of projects that were paid
for but never completed (Marwah 2014).
In section A in the appendix we provide background on ethnic bias in Nigeria.
2.2 Conceptual framework
We argue that the Nigerian oil boom led to greater structural transformation in Southern
Nigeria than in Northern Nigeria, and that this explains the changing regional differences
we see across birth cohorts. Our main results are consistent with the scattered evidence from
the secondary literature that the North-South income divide widened during the oil boom
(Bevan et al. 1999, p. 107). This was driven by the relative expansion of manufacturing,
services, and commerce in the South, and occurred despite the relative decline of Southern
agriculture. Although the North dominated politics, general equilibrium effects outweighed
direct transfers, which were themselves mitigated by political compromise (Bevan et al. 1999,
p. 187).
Manufacturing defied the standard “Dutch Disease” pattern and expanded during the oil
boom. Several reasons have been proposed for this, including the non-market allocation of
resources (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 51,113), government support for specific industries (Bienen
1988, p. 243), protectionism (Adenikinju and Alaba 1999, p. 255), an overvalued exchange
rate that cheapened the import of raw materials and intermediate goods (Struthers 1990),
and the downstream location of some manufacturing activities from oil (Struthers 1990).
Manufacturing gains were naturally most pronounced in the South, where the sector had
long been concentrated (Mustapha 2006, p. 9).
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New urban wage earners benefitted from the oil boom. Until the 1980s, living standards
were clearly higher in urban than rural areas, particularly for wage earners (Bevan et al.
1999, p. 66, 100). While this was partly driven by manufacturing and services, this urban
expansion was also driven by employment in the government sector. Further, civil service
wages increased dramatically during the oil boom (Bienen 1988, p. 241). This dispropor-
tionately benefitted members of Southern ethnic groups, who have been over-represented in
both federal and lower-level public employment through the post-colonial period (Mustapha
2006, p. 25,29).
The Northern elite was comparatively poorly placed to benefit from the expansion of com-
mercial activity (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 66). Even without government involvement, expansion
of the private sector would be expected to have disproportionate effects on the South. Accord-
ing to Mustapha (2006, p. 31):
Ethnic inequalities are pervasive in Nigeria, affecting not just the public sector, but
also the private sector. Invariably, the senior management and professional cadre of
industries and businesses also reflect the patterns of inequalities in educational and
professional achievements, with the southwest and southeast having the largest numbers
of private sector professionals.
Taking rising incomes in a growing Southern urban sector as given, the microeconomic
outcomes we observe can be understood. A large literature exists emphasizing that conditions
in early life predict later life outcomes, such as socio-economic status, education, and income
(Almond 2006; Almond and Currie 2011). Though many of these studies focus on health, this
is unlikely to explain our results concerning education, fertility, marriage, and work. Relative
height and BMI outcomes for members of southern ethnic groups are worse for those born
in times of high oil prices; the literature generally takes these as measures of adverse health
conditions in early life (e.g. Hoyne et al. 2016). For the same reason, parental investments that
reinforce health endowments (e.g. Almond and Mazumder 2013) are unlikely mechanisms.
Rather, the outcomes we consider are themselves products of the incomes, prices, and
time constraints faced by an individual’s parents (Blau 1999), all of which are affected by the
macroeconomic changes described above. Increases in education, work, skilled work, and
age at first marriage, as well as declines in fertility are all consistent with a southern individual
having been raised in an urban environment where public services are more easily available
and parental incomes are higher. Parental income may improve these outcomes by helping
parents more easily provide education, ability, noncognitive skills, or labor market experience
to their children (Blanden et al. 2007). Greater income—particularly if it is perceived as
permanent—can reduce parents’ stress and depression, while improving their health, social
standing, and ability to afford books, child care, schooling, better housing, and residence in
a better neighbourhood (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Hoyne et al. 2016; Maurin 2002; Milligan
and Stabile 2011). Further, oil prices and greater incomes may both have changed the input
prices faced by Nigerian parents (Currie and Almond 2011).
The availability of education, in particular, will have been improved due to the 1976-1981
Universal Primary Education program that was funded by the oil boom, though our results,
contra Osili and Long (2008), suggest that it was members of southern ethnic groups who
were the principal beneficiaries. The relative increase in education itself partially explains the
relative changes found in skilled work, fertility, and age at first marriage. Several studies have
shown that women who receive more education are more likely to work in better jobs, marry
later, and have fewer children (e.g. Duflo et al. 2015; Isen and Stevenson 2010). While we
focus on incomes in early life, performance in the early years of education facilitates ultimate
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educational attainment. Education is not, however, a sufficient statistic, in that controlling
for years of schooling does not render any of the other results insignificant.
It is not the case, however, that all parental investments should be expected to rise in
response to the macroeconomic changes outlined above. Other studies have shown that mater-
nal labor force participation, for example, may reduce time-intensive investments in children
or adversely affect their health (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; Miller and Urdinola 2010),
though theoretical predictions are ambiguous (Currie and Almond 2011). In addition, rela-
tive health effects in the South may be worsened by the sanitary environment in urban areas,
reduced availability of nutritious food as agriculture declines, and in-migration from other
regions that strains local infrastructure.4
3 Data and identification strategy
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Outcomes
The main source of data for this study is the Nigerian DHS, carried out by the Nigerian
National Population Commission. For 2008, the DHS interviewed a nationally representative
sample of 33,385 women aged 15–49. These data were collected by a stratified two-stage
cluster design that was intended to provide a representative sample at both the national and
state levels. Though there is no claim that the data are further representative at the ethnic
group level, there is no indication that the sampling procedure is likely to have provided a
systematically unrepresentative sample of any particular ethnic group.
Our data cover women born between 1958 and 1993. Nigeria was an oil-producing country
for all the years of birth covered by the DHS data. The survey questionnaire for women asks
about a wide variety of health and fertility indicators that we consider. We report summary
statistics in Table B.1 in the appendix. A little over 40% of our sample consists of women
from Southern ethnic groups.
3.1.2 Oil prices
The oil price used is the West Texas Intermediate price in 1984 US dollars taken from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED). In Fig. 2, we plot the log of the real oil price and Nigerian
oil production in millions of barrels. The graph shows considerable fluctuation in oil prices
from the first oil crisis in 1973, with both large increases and declines being observed within
the period we analyze. This allays concerns that we are identifying the consequences of one
large temporary shock to the oil price or that our identification is based on a smooth trend.
Oil production in Nigeria starts from a low base in our sample period, but increases before
the oil crisis and then fluctuates thereafter. For the majority of the sample period there is
considerable oil production in Nigeria, but our results are robust to excluding the period
before 1970, when the dominance of oil relative to all other exports begins.
4 Our work is, then, linked to a broader literature that relates economic development, female labor force
participation, education, and endogenous fertility (Galor and Weil 1996, 2000; Vogl 2015).
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Fig. 2 The real oil price and Nigerian oil production
3.1.3 Mechanisms
We collect data on agriculture from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s FAOSTAT
website.5 This source reports the real value of food production for Nigeria as a whole in
2004–2006 international dollars. We are not aware of panel data on Nigerian food production
at a sub-national level that overlaps with the period of the oil boom, or that covers a period
of more than three years. We do discuss below whether the cultivation of crops specific to
Northern or Southern Nigeria responds to oil prices.
We collect data on investments from the children’s recode section of the DHS. For each
standard DHS survey, women are asked multiple questions about children born in the past
five years, such as the vaccinations they received, how long they were breastfed, and the
circumstances of their births. Three waves of the Nigerian DHS include ethnicity data that
allow us to classify these recently-born children as “Northern” or “Southern”: 1999, 2003 and
2008. Similarly, the individual recode portions of the DHS from these three waves also inform
us about the status of women of child-bearing age. In particular, we consider an indicator
for having an earth floor, an indicator for having electricity, the weight of the respondent,
an indicator for whether she is currently working, and an indicator for whether her partner
works in agriculture.
3.2 Identification strategy
Our identification strategy attempts to isolate the effects of oil price changes on members
of Southern ethnic groups relative to members of Northern groups through a difference-in-
difference approach. Changes in the oil price can be safely assumed to be exogenous, as
Nigeria accounts for less than 4% of world oil production.6 Our regression equation is as
follows:
5 http://faostat3.fao.org/.
6 See http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1.
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Outcomeigt = β ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3) × SouthEthnicityg
+ x ′igtγ + φt + ηg + ηg × t + eigt . (1)
Here, Outcomeigt is the outcome for individual i of ethnic group g born in year t . The
outcomes we consider are height, BMI, number of years of education, a dummy for working,
age at first marriage, age at first birth, and number of children. The three year moving average
of the logarithm of the West Texas Intermediate oil price, deflated by the US consumer price
index (CPI), is ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3).7 SouthEthnici t yg is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one if the individual is part of an ethnic group for which over half the sampled
population lives in the South of Nigeria.8 Since state of birth is not registered in our data, our
use of ethnicity is a proxy for region of birth and is not susceptible to migration in response to
oil prices. A positive coefficient on this variable indicates that the relative outcome responds
positively to positive oil price shocks. Unless otherwise indicated, it is this composite variable
ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3) × SouthEthnici t yg that we refer to as the oil price “shock” in our
tables and discussion.
xit is a vector of controls that includes a constant. In our base specification, our controls
include dummy variables for urban residence, female household head, region of residence,
religion and survey month. These controls are chosen because they are plausibly exogenous,
though our results are not sensitive to whether we include them.9 The region of residence
fixed effects, similarly, ensure our results are driven not simply by living in the South, but
being from a Southern ethnicity. φt and ηg are fixed effects for year of birth and ethnic group,
respectively. Our baseline specification also includes an ethnicity-specific time trend ηg × t ,
which allows us to demonstrate that our results are not driven by regional trends correlated
with oil prices. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnicity level.
Although we focus on the broad North-South distinction, it is feasible to consider a more
disaggregate set of ethnic responses. The DHS data records more than 200 ethnic groups.
We can estimate a separate effect for each group from the regression:
Outcomeigt =
G∑
g=1
βg ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3) × (Ethnicityg = g)
+ x ′igtγ + φt + ηg + ηg × t + eigt . (2)
We omit the Hausa as the modal category and present our results graphically on a map of
Nigeria in Sect. 4, rather than presenting the more than 200 coefficients obtained.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 1 summarizes our main results with the full set of controls for all outcomes. All our
results are significant at the 1% level, and the standardized magnitudes of our results are
7 We use the moving average to alleviate measurement error, to capture the in utero period, and because of
the salience of past income realizations with imperfect credit markets.
8 As a robustness check we consider excluding Lagos in determining our definition, as it is the recipient of
immigration from across the country. Only a few small ethnic groups that each make up less than 1% of our
sample are no longer defined as Southern according to this definition.
9 As a placebo exercise, we have made religion an outcome variable; the “shock” does not predict if a
respondent is Catholic, Muslim, or an “other” Christian (not reported).
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Table 1 Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education Skilled Fertility BMI Height Age at F.M. Working
Shock 0.849*** 0.0737*** −0.469*** 0.415*** −0.573*** 0.681*** 0.106***
(0.145) (0.0109) (0.0940) (0.146) (0.166) (0.135) (0.0211)
Observations 33,041 33,072 33,072 32,168 32,193 25,096 32,823
Ethnic F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Y.O.B. F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Standard errors clustered by ethnicity in
parentheses. All regressions are OLS. Controls are dummy variables for urban residence, female household
head, region of residence, religion and survey month. All regressions include a constant. The “shock” is the
interaction of the three year moving average of the log real oil price in an individual’s year of birth with an
indicator for Southern ethnicity, unless otherwise indicated
quite consistent. A one standard deviation increase in the year of birth oil price for women of
Southern ethnic groups (around 0.5 log points) results in a change relative to Northerners of
between 0.05 to 0.10 standard deviations of the outcome variables. In absolute magnitudes,
this change represents 0.43 more years of education, an increase of 3.7% in the probability
of having a skilled occupation, 0.23 fewer children born, a BMI 0.21 points heavier, a fall in
height of 0.29 centimeters, a 0.34 year increase in the age at first marriage, and an increase
of 5.3% in the probability of working.
For comparison with other results in the literature, the relative decrease in years of edu-
cation due to a one standard deviation fall in the oil price, 0.43 years, is larger in magnitude
than that of being born in the influenza pandemic year of 1919 in the US (0.15 in Almond
2006). In a study of the effect of rainfall during year of birth on adult outcomes in Indonesia,
Maccini and Yang (2009) find that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall increases
grades completed by 0.33 and increases height by 0.86 centimeters. Our results are, then, of
a plausible magnitude when compared to those found in previous studies in this literature.
In Fig. 3 we address the fact that variation in oil prices is annual and make our identifying
variation explicit. Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), we collapse our data to the annual
level. For each of our dependent variables of interest, we compute the mean difference
between members of Northern and Southern ethnic groups by birth cohort. For each outcome,
we regress this gap on the three year moving average of the real log oil price and a linear time
trend. We show partial residual plots for each regression in Fig. 3. We report the estimated
coefficient on the oil price measure as well as its standard error in each figure. Except in the
case of BMI, these results confirm our baseline findings: members of Southern ethnicities
born in years of high oil prices achieve greater levels of education, are more likely to have
skilled occupations, have reduced fertility, lower heights, marry later, and are more likely to
work compared to their Northern counterparts.
It is possible that our results are driven by one or two large ethnic groups that are dispropor-
tionately aided or harmed by oil prices. To determine whether this is the case, we disaggregate
our definition of Southern ethnic group into the two largest groups, Igbo and Yoruba, Niger
Delta ethnicities taken together, and other Southern ethnic groups taken together. We also
divide the Northern ethnic groups into the two main groups, Hausa and Fulani, and other
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Fig. 3 Results collapsed to annual means. B and s.e. refer to the coefficient and standard error on the log
real oil price in a regression of the detrended outcome listed on the y axis on the detrended three year moving
average of the log real oil price, with robust standard errors. N is the sample size
Northern ethnic groups taken together. We interact all these new groupings with oil prices
(with the exception of the Hausa who are our excluded category).
Results are reported in Table 2, and do not support the notion that our baseline results are
driven by one ethnic group. For several outcomes, other Northern groups are indistinguishable
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from the Hausa. The Fulani diverge even more sharply from the southern ethnicities than
do the Hausa. Table 2 also demonstrates that results are not localized to the oil-producing
Delta region, as Delta ethnicities show patterns broadly similar to those of the other southern
ethnicities in the sample.
Within the Southern ethnic groups, there are significant differences in coefficient values for
all outcomes, since estimates for the interaction of Igbo and Yoruba with oil prices are precise.
However, the signs of the coefficients are always the same, and differences are rarely large in
magnitude. This validates our baseline division of ethnic groups into northern and southern.
Furthermore, none of our four divisions of Southern ethnic groups show consistently larger
coefficients. The Yoruba, for instance, are the Southern ethnic group that benefits relatively
least from oil prices in terms of education, but most in terms of probability of working.
We next implement the even more disaggregated specification given in (2). Rather than
reporting each βˆg estimate in a table, we plot a map of the estimated coefficients in Fig. 4. The
units in this figure are Local Government Areas, and each is assigned the coefficient of the
modal ethnic group in the DHS. The North-South gradient is clear in each figure. Although
the intensity of response differs across southern groups, most southern LGAs have the same
sign, while Northern LGAs (mostly in the Northeast, as the Hausa cluster in the Northwest
and, as the omitted category, are depicted as zeroes) typically have the opposite sign. Though
our baseline North-South distinction is coarse, this is an accurate reflection of the data. In
Figure C.3, in the appendix, we present the same results mapped onto cells 0.5◦ in latitude
by 0.5◦ in longitude.
We discuss the robustness of our results in appendix C. Our results for education, skilled
occupation, fertility, age at first marriage and currently working are robust across a range of
specifications. The results for BMI and fertility are more fragile.
5 Mechanisms
In this section we test between possible mechanisms through which early life increases in the
oil price might affect outcomes for Southern ethnic groups relative to Northerners. Although
the account given in the conceptual framework above draws largely on secondary sources,
we are able to corroborate many of these mechanisms empirically. We show that Nigerian
agriculture declined during the oil boom, and that there is some evidence that the oil boom
accentuated pre-existing differences across these regions. In particular, the relative living
standards of women of child-bearing age rose in the South during years of high oil prices,
though our data here come from a more recent period. The response of parental investments
to oil prices in this later period has been mixed.
This narrower and simpler focus of course leaves out several other regional changes
in Nigeria that contribute further to our main results. We explore these in greater detail
in the appendix, though we are often constrained to look at the responsiveness of possible
mechanisms to oil prices in more recent periods for which data are available. In the appendix,
we discuss the possible mediating and moderating roles roles for selective survival and
fertility, violence, the provision of measurable public goods, democracy, and co-ethnicity
with the president.
5.1 Agriculture and industry
The existing literature emphasizes the negative effect of oil production on food security in
Nigeria. During the oil boom, the share of agriculture in GDP fell dramatically (Sala-i-Martin
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Fig. 4 Ethnic treatment effects over space. Each figure depicts the coefficient estimates from the regression:
Outcomeigt =
∑G
g=1 βg ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3) × (Ethnicityg = g) + x ′igt γ + φt + ηg + ηg × t + eigt .
In each Local Government Area, the coefficient βˆg is shown for the modal ethnic group in the LGA. Variables
are as defined in the text. Hausa is the omitted category and so is drawn as having a coefficient of zero. LGAs
not containing respondents not drawn
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and Subramanian 2013). The cost of food rose relative to non-food goods by 170% between
1968 and 1979, to the particular benefit of larger farmers who were surplus producers (Collier
1983). Food production could not keep pace with urban demand (Scherr 1989). Indeed, Collier
(1988) estimates that food production per capita declined during the oil boom as government
spending diverted labor out of agriculture. Food imports rose with oil prices, propelled by
real exchange rate appreciation and urbanization, while the agricultural sector was further
harmed by erratic policies towards imports, pricing, and marketing (Pinto 1987; Freund
1978). Nominal exchange rates were kept constant on the belief that cheap imports would
help preserve political stability by benefitting urban elites (Scherr 1989; Watts 2013).
We provide additional evidence for this mechanism using data from FAOSTAT. The FAO
reports the Gross Production Value of food in Nigeria in constant 2004-2006 international
dollars. We normalize this by population, also taken from the FAO. We show that Nigerian
food production is negatively correlated with oil prices by estimating the following:
log(PerCapitaFoodProductiont ) = α + β ln(RealOilPricet )M A(3)
+ γ yeart + δyear2t + 	t . (3)
Variables are as defined above. We use ordinary least squares with robust standard errors
in our baseline. Results are similar with Newey-West standard errors, or if we use a linear
rather than a quadratic time trend. We plot both time series in Figure D.4, in the appendix.
The elasticity of per capita food production in response to oil prices is −0.227 with a standard
error of 0.019. Though our data do not allow us to show whether this response was greater
in the South, Scherr (1989) argues that the effect of oil was greater on Southern agriculture,
due to the particular labor intensiveness of root and tree crop production, the higher wages in
oil and related urban sectors in this region, and the collapse of export markets for Southern
agricultural exports. Other writers have made similar claims. Walker (2000) argues that
Southern export producers such as cocoa farmers were harmed by an overvalued exchange
rate and rising labor costs as workers migrated towards better urban opportunities. Khan
(1994, p. 187) suggests that the labor-intensiveness of southern agriculture made this latter
pressure particularly acute.
5.2 Baseline characteristics
To what degree do our results reflect prior differences between Northern and Southern ethnic
groups that made them likely to respond differently to the oil boom? In Table 3, we add
additional controls to (1) that take the form ln(Real Oil Pricet )M A(3) × Baselineg , and
assess the degree to which these additional controls account for the coefficient we find on
ln(Real Oil Pricet )M A(3)×SouthEthnici t yg . In particular, we consider three broad classes
of characteristics to include in Baselineg: mean outcomes for cohorts born before the oil
boom; pre-colonial state centralization, and; colonial missions.
For ease of notation, we report the coefficient on ln(Real Oil Pricet )M A(3) × Baselineg
as I nteraction in Table 3. In the first panel, our measure of Baselineg is the mean years
of education of members of ethnic group g born in 1972 and earlier. Levels of education
have long been higher in Southern Nigeria than in the North (Dev et al. 2016). While this
does not explain away the majority of our results, it does make some of our coefficient
estimates smaller. Notably, for education, fertility, and age at first marriage, the interaction is
significant and has the same sign as coefficient reported in Table 1. For fertility and age at first
marriage, the coefficient on the main shock variable becomes very small and insignificant,
with all of the differential response of southern ethnic groups now loading on their pre-
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boom levels of education. These results suggest that the reason why southern women see
their relative fertility decline and relative age at marriage rise is because southern women
were initially more educated when the oil boom began. That is: high oil prices accentuated
existing differences across regions. For height, the main result is now insignificant, though
the interaction is also insignificant and the decline in the coefficient on the principal shock
variable is minor. This is more consistent with collinearity than with education serving as the
true mediating variable.
In the second panel of Table 3, we replace Baselineg with the mean of the outcome variable
for members of ethnic group g born in 1972 and earlier. For education, this replicates the
exercise in the first panel. For age at first marriage, there is some indication that the oil boom
again led to differential responses across Northern and Southern ethnic groups because it
strengthened their pre-existing differences. For skilled work, fertility, height and working,
the interaction is insignificant, and so there is little evidence that the North-South differential
response is explained by the different outcomes in these regions before the oil boom.
In the bottom two tables, we assess two other sources of pre-boom difference. First, fol-
lowing Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) we consider precolonial state centralization.
We merge the ethnic groups in the DHS to those for whom Murdock (1967) reports the
levels of state centralization, between 0 and 3. Second, following Nunn (2014), we consider
missions. We merge the map of missions in Roome (1925) to the map of ethnic groups in
Murdock (1959), and further merge the ethnic groups in the DHS to these in order to compute
the number of colonial missions per square kilometer. Pre-colonial state centralization does
little to explain our main results. Missions too do little to diminish the coefficients on our
baseline shock measure. The exceptions here are BMI and height. Though these are now
insignificant, the interaction of the oil price with missions is also insignificant, suggesting
that the difference with the the main result is driven by the loss of observations that could
not be matched to an ethnic group in Murdock, as well as by collinearity, and not because
missions explain the differential North-South response to oil prices.
5.3 Investments
In this section we consider the direct evidence for there being greater relative investments
made in children born in years of higher oil prices, by looking at investments in child health
and household circumstances. For child health, the DHS asks mothers a set of questions
about their children aged five and under. Aggregating data for the three waves of the DHS
for which information on ethnicity is available (1999, 2003 and 2008) we have information
available for a series health interventions for children born from 1996 to 2008. We use the
specification in (1). Results are reported in Table 4.
There is mixed evidence that higher oil prices result in relatively fewer investments in child
health by mothers of Southern ethnic groups. Higher oil prices result in more doses of the polio
vaccine, but the incidence of other vaccinations falls. The anomalous result for polio may
reflect both the degree to which polio vaccination has been encouraged by mass immunization
campaigns and the resistance of political and religious leaders in Northern Nigeria to polio
immunization after 2003 (Jegede 2007). There is a positive correlation between our shock
and the relative duration of breastfeeding, and a negative and insignificant correlation with
the relative likelihood of having a doctor assist delivery or a prenatal doctor’s visit. The
anomalous increase in breastfeeding despite decreases in other investments may be in part
due to the increase in skilled work shown above, which might provide more flexibility for
working mothers. It may also be driven in part by improved maternal health. Re-estimating
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Table 5 Contemporary effects of oil prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partner works on farm Earth floor Has electricity Weight Working
Shock −0.744*** −0.438** 0.451*** 4.426 0.778***
(0.0984) (0.169) (0.156) (4.456) (0.102)
Observations 36,177 49,712 49,510 42,422 50,218
Ethnic F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS. Controls are dummy
variables for urban residence, female household head, region of residence, religion and survey month. All
regressions include a constant. The “shock” is the interaction of the three year moving average of the log real
oil price in the survey year with an indicator for Southern ethnicity, unless otherwise indicated
these results separately for male and female children, we find similar patterns for girls and
boys (not reported).
To look at how the relative circumstances of Southern women of child-bearing age respond
to oil prices, we use the individual recode data from the DHS, similarly aggregated across the
three waves for which ethnicity is available. Using the same approach as in our main results,
we ask how household circumstances change contemporaneously with oil prices in the three
years we have available. Results are reported in Table 5. We find that Southern households
have relatively better living conditions, as measured by greater access to electricity and
reduced probability of having an earth floor. We also find that women are more likely to work
in the South in years of higher oil prices. Women’s partners, by contrast, are relatively less
likely to work on a farm in the south, either as a laborer or in self-employment.10 Together,
these results suggest a mixed pattern. Although the relative living standards of southern
households improve with higher oil prices, greater labor time outside the home reduces time
with children and some investments in children. Less direct work in agriculture is consistent
with the more general relative decline of southern agriculture suggested by the secondary
literature.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a difference-in-difference approach to show that higher oil prices
in an individual’s year of birth predict more years of education, greater likelihood of having
a skilled occupation, shorter heights, higher BMI, later marriage, lower fertility and higher
likelihood of working for women that belong to Southern ethnic groups relative to Northern
groups from the same birth cohort. The magnitudes of these effects are broadly in line with
those found in similar early-life studies.
We interpret our results as consequences of the economic transformations that follow
income gains for Southerners when oil prices are high. We find households in the South
are relatively better off in periods of higher oil prices, but reduce some investments in their
10 Using our baseline sample, we find no evidence that early-life oil prices affect a woman’s partner’s years
of education or occupational skill, or the age gap of the respondent with her partner (not reported).
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children. This is consistent with an increase in women’s working time and the movement of
men out of agriculture. These mechanisms are also highlighted in the secondary literature
(e.g. Bevan et al. 1999; Collier 1983) that has stressed a greater transition away from agri-
culture in Southern Nigeria during the oil boom than in the North. Both general equilibrium
effects and government actions favored the relative expansion of manufacturing, public sector
employment, and urbanization in the South.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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